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RESEARCH ON BIAS IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING
JON'A MEYER* and PAUL JESILOW**
A great deal of research has been conducted to determine whether and
under what circumstances extra-legal factors, such as race and gender,
affect the severity of criminal sentences handed out by judges. Most of
these studies, however, depended more upon increasing sophistication in
research methodologies and statistical techniques than well-formed research
plans. Although academic research necessarily involves building upon
earlier works and increasing sophistication as improved methods become
available, the research on judicial bias in sentencing can best be described
as a methodological battle that has intensified with each new publication.
Researchers appear to react to the work of others in the field by quickly
submitting a study that is "superior" due to more sophisticated methods
or a better choice of variables. Published research appears to focus on
the use of improved methods rather than adding to the field's understanding of judicial bias in sentencing.
This piece reviews the existing literature and highlights the pitfalls
immersed in this research.
JUDICIAL BIAS
In 1764, in the first edition of Dei delitti e delle pene (An Essay on
Crimes and Punishments), Cesare Beccaria noted that a judge's ruling
does not always reflect the legal merits of the case.' He argued that
courts favored the powerful,
justice often meant judicial favoritism; the
2
while severely sanctioning the powerless.
Beccaria felt punishment should prevent people from committing crimes.'
Among his proposed reforms, Beccaria argued for certainty and swiftness
of punishment, a legally educated citizenry, revision of the sentencing
structure to reflect the severity of each crime, and replacement of judicially
determined punishments with those set by legislators. 4 The judiciary, he
believed, with their deeply rooted biases and inconsistent sentences, were
incapable of implementing his philosophy of deterrence. Beccaria noted
that justice suffered when judges set sentences according to whim:
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1. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 5 (Branden Press, Inc. trans.

1983) (4th ed. 1775) (Translated and reprinted from Dei delitti e delle pene (4th ed. 1775)).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. Id. at 4-9, nn.31-32.
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The spirit of the laws will then be the result of the good, or bad
logic of the judge; and this will depend on his good or bad digestion;
on the violence of his passions; on the rank, and condition of the
accused, or on his connections with the judge; and on all those little
circumstances, which change the appearance of objects in the fluctuating mind of man.'
By allowing judicially determined sentences, Beccaria argued, society
permits divergent outcomes that legal reasoning cannot explain: "We see
the same crimes 6punished in a different manner at different times in the
same tribunals."
The notion of judicial bias did not end with Beccaria's comments.
Throughout American history, judges have been accused of discrimination,
primarily for sentencing non-whites more severely than whites. Judicial
bias, which occurred during earlier, more turbulent times, may have been
based upon institutionally created differences between whites and their
former slaves. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson held that- one could not expect the courts to guarantee
equality to blacks. The Court stated: "If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them
upon the same plane."'
Furthermore, some laws were designed to sentence black offenders
more harshly than whites and other minorities. 8 An 1848 Virginia statute,
for example, required the death penalty for any offense committed by
a black person that could result in three or more years in prison for a
white individual. 9 Judges could not ignore race when determining sentences
pursuant to this statute.
Despite such discriminatory laws and acts, the courts have clung to
the notion of equality connoted by the image of Lady Justice, in her
blindfold, holding a scale that allows only legal evidence to tip the pans
in favor of the state. They maintain a trusting faith that the powerful
and the powerless stand as equals before the law. 10 While it is conceivable
that most judicial acts do not involve any form of extra-legal prejudice
against minorities, examples of individual judicial bias do exist. In one
instance, when sentencing a Spanish-surnamed defendant to death, the
judge referred to him as a "cold-blooded, copper-colored, blood-thirsty,
throat-cutting, chili-eating, sheep-herding, murdering son-of-a-bitch."l

5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). This decision was a civil judgment concerning
"separate, but equal" policies and did not specifically address sentencing differences. It does,
however, illustrate the institutionalized inequity of the time.
8. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78 (1927); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
9. DAVID A. JONES, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 543 (Little,
Brown, and Co. 1981).
10. See Robert L. Smith, The Elephant in My Living Room, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 317, 318
(1987).
11. United States v. Gonzales (D.N.M. Terr. Sess. 1881), reprinted in JAMES A. INCIARDI, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 491 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 3rd ed. 1990).
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The question is not whether bias exists in the judicial system, but rather,
what kinds of biases exist and under what circumstances are they maximized or minimized.
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF BIAS
There are several potential sources for extra-legal bias in the judicial
system. Those sources that have received the most attention in criminal
justice literature are race and ethnicity, socio-economic status, gender,
and age. Other factors that are prevalent in the literature include the
type of legal counsel available to defendants, whether or not the defendants
are detained before trial, and the strength of cooperation between the
judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney.
The race or ethnicity of the defendant is the primary, and most
controversial, demographic factor scholars have scrutinized in relation to
sentencing. For the most part, the race/ethnicity debate has focused on
whether blacks are treated more harshly than their white counterparts
during the sentencing phase. The argument, as noted earlier, has become
an escalating methodological fight in which researchers denounce one
another's work in a game of academic one-upmanship.
The first empirical examination of racial bias, written by Thorsten
Sellin in 1928, concluded that blacks were discriminated against at both
the trial and sentencing stage. 1 2 After comparing government conviction
rates and sentencing records for 1926 Detroit, he found that blacks were
3
more likely to be convicted and more harshly punished than whites.
Sellin specifically analyzed the percentage of arrests that resulted in
convictions for nineteen different crimes, ranging from begging and vagrancy to murder. 14 For eleven of these offenses, the court was more
likely to convict blacks than whites. 5
By including data regarding the number of suspects arrested, Sellin,
in his conclusions, unintentionally introduced several factors associated
with the police. Such factors, for example police policy on arrest, likely
distorted the conviction rates for both blacks and whites. Sellin recognized
that the conviction rates may have been affected by "unwarranted arrests
of Negroes' '1 6 that were the result of broad sweeps in which police
arrested blacks on "the flimsiest charges.' ' 7 Thus, police policy could

12. See Thorsten Sellin, The Negro Criminal: A Statistical Note, 140 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 59 (1928).
13. Id. at 53.
14. Id. at 57.
15. Id. These eleven crimes were burglary, armed robbery, simple larceny, assault and battery,
disturbing the peace, accosting and soliciting, common prostitute, sex crimes, offenses against the
state drug and prohibition laws, and offenses involving embezzling, forgery, and similar crimes.
Sellin argued that, once convicted, blacks were sentenced more harshly than whites, noting that
30.90o of black felons received a jail sentence compared with only 15.5% of the whites. This
finding, as Sellin points out, may be an artifact of the higher number of "serious offenses calling
for heavier penalties" committed by blacks. Id. at 59.
16. Id.
17. Sellin, supra note 12, at 54.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

have affected conviction rates regardless of how judges handled the cases
at a later stage.
Another important factor to consider, when interpreting Sellin's findings, is the notion of reduced charges. 8 Prosecutorial discretion before
trial and the fact finder's discretion at the judgment stage may distort
conviction rates. The conviction rates may fail to adequately reflect the
offenses for which the perpetrators were originally arrested. 19 The degree
of a specific offense may be lowered, defendants may be acquitted of
some charges but not others, charges may be dismissed, or transformed
altogether. For example, defendants arrested for burglary may be convicted
of trespassing due to weak evidence. This phenomenon may well taint
Sellin's data. While only three blacks were arrested for manslaughter/
negligent homicide, ten were convicted of this offense. 20 One might argue
that some of these convictions were for offenses that had originally been
charged as murder. Assuming this is true for other offenses, the reported
conviction rates may be invalid.
Sellin's initial report fails to include the statistical significance of his
findings. Today, Sellin's methodology for determining which of the two
conviction rates was higher would be insufficient for supporting his
conclusion that bias exists. Indeed, the differences between the two were
not always large; discrepancies for six out of eighteen offenses were less
than 2.2 percent. His figures for assault and battery, for example, yielded
a discrepancy of one-tenth of one percent or 49.0 percent for blacks
versus 48.9 percent for whites, 21 hardly a meaningful difference.
Another concern with the validity of Sellin's findings stems from his
use of government data. The manner in which such information is collected
is of interest to researchers. Data can be gathered from existing records,
usually government statistics, or by a researcher's obiervations. Official
records are usually much easier to obtain, both in terms of time and
money. A researcher will encounter obstacles when attempting to collect
original data. A defendant's prior record, for example, which strongly
influences penalties, 22 is often deemed confidential by the system, and,
therefore, is unavailable to the researcher.
The use of existing records has its own set of complications. The
analysis of existing records necessarily limits the information researchers
may consider to those items that were originally recorded. Unfortunately,
researchers wish to consider at least one tidbit of information that the
original source failed to examine. Furthermore, researchers must accept
existing records in whatever form they appear, although they may be

18. See id.at 62.
19. See Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: Toward a
Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processings, 24 CRIMNOLOGY 623, 624
(1986).
20. Sellin, supra note 12, at 57.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Edwin M. Lemert & Judy Rosberg, The Administration of Justice to Minority
Groups inLos Angeles County, 2 U.C. PuBs. IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 1 (1948).
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incomplete, incorrect or biased. Sellin appropriately noted, "The records
of our police departments, our courts, and our penal institutions have
2
not been compiled to suit the purposes of criminological research."
Sellin was obliged to accept the data as complete and correct, free
from any biases.2 As the figures for manslaughter indicated, more blacks
were convicted for this offense than were arrested. It is apparent that
errors crept into the data and Sellin recognized this problem. For example,
he was unable to offer a clear interpretation of a government table that
showed types of sentences by race:
The study from which this table has been compiled does not indicate
the exact meaning of the data presented in this column or the process
by which they were secured. I assume these figures represent average
25
minimum and maximum sentences; the heading is far from clear.
More than forty years later, a courtroom expert argued that inaccuracies
to
in data were sometimes due to the courtroom workgroups' efforts
26
This
scrutiny.
from
practices
sentencing
their
and
protect themselves
self-protecting behavior led to omissions in the data that were more than
coincidental; bureaucrats cataloged a host of factors in order to present
judges in a favorable light, while ignoring other factors that would
accurately reflect the manner in which they carried out their judicial
duties.
A final methodological problem with Sellin's attempt to study judicial
bias was that his data may have included cases where juries, rather than
judges, determined final sentences. Jurors often determine the penalties
in murder cases. Often times these decisions include penalties of execution
or life imprisonment. 27 Early researchers failed to report who comprised
the actual sentencing body that they studied and labeled biased. This
may be due to either a lack of interest in the matter or, more likely,
because of an inability to procure this information from existing governmental records. 2 It is likely that juries ordered some of the punishments
in the early studies. Sentences that tend to reflect a jury's biases demthe inadequacies of the jury system, rather than actual judicial
onstrate
29
bias.
It is difficult to determine whether Sellin's findings can be cited as
evidence of racial bias in sentencing. Questionable data combined with
unsophisticated methods and conflicting results make this article difficult
to rely upon as irrefutable evidence of bias.

23. Sellin, supra note 12, at 54.
24. Id.
25: Id.at 61.
26. See generally Maureen Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower
Criminal Court, 5 LAW & Soc'y Rv.473 (1971).
27. See John Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a
Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & Soc'Y 357, 378 (1974).
28. See, e.g., Sellin, supra note 12, at 54.
29. See Hagan, supra note 27, at 378.
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RACIAL DYADS
The 1940s saw the introduction of a new method for studying judicial
bias. In 1941, Guy Johnson introduced the concept of victim-offender
dyads as a determining factor in the severity of sentences. 0 He argued
that a "caste definition of crime" defined offenses against whites as
more serious than offenses against blacks:
Obviously the murder of a white person by a Negro and the murder
of a Negro by a Negro are not at all the same kind of murder from
the standpoint of the upper caste's scale of values, yet in crime
statistics they are thrown together.
Johnson found that blacks who killed whites were more likely to be
convicted and punished severely than blacks who murdered other blacks.
Blacks who murdered other blacks "probably go unpunished" or are
lightly punished. 3 Johnson concluded that victim-offender dyads impacted
sentences because intragroup homicides by blacks did not disturb white
32
majority group members.

Harold Garfinkel examined court records and death certificates in North
Carolina. He explained that the criminality of blacks who killed other
blacks was determined at trial, while the criminality of blacks accused
of killing whites was determined, or rather assumed, at the point of
accusation. 33 Blacks who killed other blacks were presumed innocent until
proven guilty, while blacks who killed whites were assumed guilty even
34
before trial.

Later researchers were unprepared to accept the victim-offender dyad
results reported by Johnson and Garfinkel as proof of racial bias by
judges or the criminal justice system. Edward Green, for example, argued
that circumstances of crimes committed by blacks against whites were
more serious.35 Such crimes were "of a more aggravated nature, indicating
a deeper internalization of the value of violence," while crimes by blacks
against blacks were "high in impulsiveness and low in . . . malicious
intent." For Green, the seriousness of the actual offense explained why
blacks received harsher treatment in the courts.
Two methodological problems that plagued Sellin also faced Johnson
and Garfinkel: questions regarding whether a judge or jury determined
sentences and a lack of statistical sophistication. First, since both Johnson
and Garfinkel studied murder cases,3 6 it is probable that juries rather

than judges determined which offenders would be executed. Both studies
30.
93, 98
31.
32.
33.
(1949).
34.
35.

See Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS AMER. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
(1941).
id.
Id.
Harold Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-RacialHomicides, 27 Soc. FORCES 369

Id. at 377.
See Edward Green, Inter- and Intra-Racial Crime Relative to Sentencing, 55 J. CRsM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY, & POL. Sci. 348, 358 (1964).
36. See generally notes 30 and 33.
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were conducted in states where murder trials were often heard by juries.17
Garfinkel noted, for example, that North Carolina's rules of trial procedure prohibited bench trials, unless the defendant pled guilty to a
homicide charge, besides murder in the first degree.18 In such situations,
the judge only presided over the sentencing phases of trials. 9
A North Carolina statute further invalidated Johnson's and Garfinkel's
work regarding judicial bias. This statute mandated the death penalty
for defendants convicted of first degree murder. ° Thus, it is more valid
to ascribe the extra-legal biases to prosecutors who chose the charges to
be levied against defendants. Prosecutors are usually conceded to be the
they may, without
most powerful actors in the criminal justice drama since
4
official review, choose to review or drop charges. 1
The second methodological mystery with Johnson's and Garfinkel's
studies is the exclusion of significance levels for their statistics. Without
such information, we are left to guess whether their results were merely
a chance conclusion created by the sample they chose to study or valid
representations of sentencing. 42 Both authors used simple comparisons of
percentages. Although their comparisons may have appealed to the uninitiated reader of yesterday, contemporary research audiences demand
more sophistication before accepting a study's results. For the foregoing
reasons the extent of bias ascribed to judges in these studies is suspect.
FURTHER REFINEMENTS
Edwin Lemert and Judy Rosberg were the first widely published researchers to include tests of significance in their findings regarding judicial
bias. 43 They criticized research that failed to include controls for an
accused's prior record."4 Evidence of continuing illegal activity, they
posited, was important in judicial decision making. 45 Their work, for
example, indicated that defendants with prior records were less likely to
receive probation and that defendants with no previous criminal convictions were seldom sentenced to prison. 46 The types of offenses for which47
defendants had previously been sentenced also swayed their punishments.
Judges, as with the rest of us, rank past criminal activities on a scale
of subjective importance. The judges consider: "Was anybody injured?

37. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 98; Garfinkel, supra note 33, at 373. Johnson's study included
cases from Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia; Garfinkel's included cases from North Carolina.
38. See Garfinkel, supra note 33, at 373.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 375.
41. See Albonetti, supra note 19 at 624.
42. Tests of significance allow the researchers to state that results are not apt to be due to
coincidence. Most research prior to 1950 did not determine the likelihood of findings being attributable
to fluke, leaving readers to peruse the tables and statistics and speculate for themselves whether or
not the findings were statistically valid.
43. See generally Lemert & Rosberg, supra note 22.
44. See id.at 8-9.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.at l.

114
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Was there the potential for serious harm? How much money was stolen? '4
49
Serious prior records led judges to dispense harsher sentences.
Lemert and Rosberg noted that whites were convicted of less dangerous

offenses: grand thefts, second degree burglaries, and victimless crimes.5 0
Minorities, on the other hand, had a higher number of prior felonies,
such as assaults with deadly weapons." Whites and minorities convicted
of similar offenses might possess widely differing past criminal records.
Thus, the appearance of judicial bias in early studies might have been
explained by this fundamental difference.
NEW FOLLY
A methodological message from Lemert's and Rosberg's work was that

researchers had to expand the number of items they considered when
attempting to extract the effect of bias from apparent sentencing dis-

parities.5 2 In other words, judicial decisions are based on several matters
and research should reflect this complexity. With this in mind, Henry
Bullock collected information on race, types of offenses, previous felonies,
types of plea agreements, counties of residence, and length of sentences

for inmates in the Texas State Prison53 serving sentences for burglary,

rape, and murder.14 He posited that those studies which failed to control
for these factors may "have derived conclusions concerning racial bias
from comparisons of white and Negro subjects whose characteristics
'5
differed significantly in factors other than race."
While Bullock's attempt to study bias was admirable he failed to
adequately address a significant issue: who was doing the sentencing?

48. See generally John P. McConnell & J. David Martin, JudicialAttitudes and Public Morals,
55 A.B.A. J. 1129 (1969).
49. See Lemert & Rosberg, supra note 22 at 11.
50. See Id. at 7 tbl. 7.
51. See id. at 6.
52. See generally Lemert & Rosberg, supra note 22.
53. By collecting data for inmates in prison, Bullock effectively eliminated two potentially
important types of defendants whose inclusion might have altered his results: those sentenced to
death and those assigned to chain gangs. Offenders sentenced to death were excluded by Bullock
because he omitted inmates awaiting execution and could not gather data for those already executed.
It is possible that this affected his unexpected finding that black murderers were sentenced more
leniently than white murderers. Garfinkel's work on offender-victim dyads suggests that all murders
are not viewed the same by sentencing agents. If blacks were sentenced to death for murders of
whites, but given short sentences for murders of other blacks, it is likely that only blacks who
killed other blacks were included in Bullock's study. And if whites are more likely than non-whites
to have their death sentences commuted, it is possible that a number of white murderers had their
sentences changed to life imprisonment while black murderers were executed, making them unavailable
for study. See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1, 20 tbl. IX (1964). Similarly, chain gang members would not be included in Bullock's study.
Steiner and Brown noted that blacks were more likely to be sentenced to chain gangs while whites
convicted of the same offenses would be sent to prison. JESSE I. STEINER & ROY M. BROWN, THt
NORTH CAROLINA CtAIN GANG 136-37 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1927), cited in Sellin, supra note 12,
at 59, 62 n.16. Offenders sentenced to chain gangs would not be represented in Bullock's prison
sample, which could easily bias his findings.
54. Henry A. Bullock, Significance of the Race Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52
J. CRIm. LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sci. 411, 412-13 (1961).
55. Id. at 412.
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56
Bullock refers to his work as a study of "bias at the judicial level,"
but he limited his research to offenders sentenced by juries. Nonetheless,
Bullock's work is often cited in the judicial bias literature 57and forms
part of the foundation upon which later studies were built.
Bullock's study was one of many projects that fueled conflict in the
methodological battle to determine whether judicial bias existed.5" He was
one of the first researchers to determine the extent to which the severity
of a particular sentence and sentence-affecting criteria were related. For
example, Bullock reported the strength of the association between types
of crimes for which defendants were convicted and their respective punishments, rather than simply identifying that a relationship existed.
Bullock reported that the severity of an offense, the region where the
case was heard, the extent of urbanization in that region, and the type
of plea agreement a defendant entered influenced sentencing.5 9 As the
severity of an offense or the degree of urbanization increased, so did
the length of a defendant's sentence. Furthermore, those who pled not
guilty or were tried in East Texas, received longer sentences than those
who pled guilty or were tried in West Texas. 60
The importance of Bullock's research is not in his findings, but in the
trend he started. Researchers later refined the factors Bullock believed
contributed to punishment severity and included them in their studies.
Bullock's "degree of urbanization" measure, 6' which he based on whether
the county contained at least one large city, is certainly a precursor to
the later use of ecological variables to determine effects of community
context on sentencing by judges. 62
Bullock's research sheds little light on judicially ordered penalties because he only surveyed offenders sentenced by juries. Some of his findings,
however, may be applicable to judges. 63 Criminal court judges and jurors
are usually drawn from the same community and, in theory, represent
that locale. Because the fact finders' beliefs may reflect local sentiment
regarding crime, one could argue that their respective beliefs are similar
to one another.

56. Id.
57. See generally Hagan, supra note 27, at 362; John Hagan & Kristen Bumiller, Making Sense
of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing Research in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENC NG: THE
SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstein ed., 1983)
58. See generally Bullock, supra note 54.
59. Bullock, supra note 54, at 414. Unlike many jurisdictions, juries in Texas can sentence in
both misdemeanor and felony cases where the defendant has pleaded guilty. Defendants choose
between being sentenced by the judge or jury. When a defendant pleads guilty to a jury, the jury
hears the case and is then directed by the judge to "find" the defendant guilty. After "finding"
the defendant guilty, the jury proceeds with the penalty phase of the case. Interview with Maureen
Bailey, El Paso, Texas, Court Coordinator (1993).
60. Bullock, supra note 54, at 414.
61. Id.
62. See generally Martha A. Myers, Economic Inequality and Discrimination in Sentencing, 65
Soc. FORCES 747 (1987).
63. See Bullock, supra note 54.
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DIFFERENCES IN CRIMINALITY
In his review of sentencing studies, Edward Green noted several methodological deficiencies. 4 He criticized the lack of adequate controls for
an accused's prior record. 65 The exact number of felony convictions an
offender accumulated, Green hypothesized, would have a greater effect
on judicially determined sentences than a vague conception of the defendant's prior record. 66 He chastised researchers for the use of faulty
data and addressed their inadequate statistical controls:
Thus the complexity of the sentencing process, not to mention the
process of human judgement [sic], has been all but submerged in
simplistic interpretations based upon fragmentary data. The neglect,
in comparing the sentences of various groups of cases, to impose
statistical controls appropriate to the subject of inquiry has resulted
in a circularity of reasoning-the lack of proper and uniform criteria
for sentencing is inferred from the disparities in sentences;
and these
67
in turn are attributed to the lack of adequate criteria.
In order to alleviate his concerns, Green examined a sample of cases
tried in a "non-jury prison court" of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter
Sessions, during its 1956 and 1957 terms. 6 This study is significant for
two major reasons. First, Green limited his study to cases where judges
had imposed sentences. 69 Second, he identified three categories of criteria
that could affect judicially
determined sentences: legal, extra-legal, and
70
process related matters.
First, legal matters included the types and number of offenses for
which the defendants were being sentenced, the defendants' prior criminal
records and official recommendations made to the court through presentence and neuropsychiatric reports. 71 Second, extra-legal or "legally
irrelevant" items included the offenders' individual characteristics, such
as their sex, age, race, and place of birth. 72 Process related considerations
were composed of factors relating to the dispositions of cases: whether
the defendants pled guilty, whether the defendants were represented by
private or public counsel, and the quirks and idiosyncracies of individual
73
judges and prosecutors.
Green found that the types of crimes offenders committed were the
primary determinants of the severity of their punishments; the greater

64. See EDWARD GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA (St. Martin's Press

1961).
65. See id. at 10.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 20.
68. GREEN, supra note 64, at 21.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
GREEN,

supra note 64, at 23.
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the physical harm to the victims, the harsher the penalties.74 The number
of offenses for which the defendants were ultimately convicted was the
second most important sentence determinant-the greater the number,
the more severe the sentences." The defendants' prior records, as predictors of sentence severity, took third place-as the number of prior
offenses increased, so did the severity of the judicially imposed punishments. Finally, the recency of the defendants' prior convictions ranked
fourth in explaining sentence severity-the-qiore recent the convictions,
the harsher the penalties.
Extra-legal and process related matters did not significantly affect the
judges' sentencing decision once legal matters were taken into consideration.76 Green concluded that those who attributed sentence disparities
to judicial bias were erroneous:
To sum up, the results provide assurance that the deliberations of
the sentencing judge are not at the mercy of his passions or prejudices
but comply with the mandate of the law. The criteria for sentencing
recognized in the law, the nature of the crime and the offender's
prior criminal record, are the decisive determinants of the severity of
77
the sentence.
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORISTS: THE COURTROOM
WORKGROUP
Abraham Blumberg was one of the first researchers to argue that the
organization of the courts affected judicial decision making. 78 Earlier
research virtually ignored the realities of the court system, that it operates
much like other organizations, with a "community of human beings who
are engaged in doing certain things with, to, and for each other." 7 9 The
mutual cooperation between key players in the court system may explain
judicial decisions regarding sentencing.
James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob maintained that those who form
the courtroom workgroup (the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney)
are driven by similar incentives and shared goals. 80 These motivating
factors have a greater impact on sentencing than judicial biases against
particular defendants.
Peter Nardulli argued that the courtroom workgroup is composed of
the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney because "[w]ithin the courtroom setting these three individuals enjoy a virtual monopoly of power."',

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
GREEN, supra note 64, at 98, 101.
Id. at 102.
See ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967).
Id. at ix.
80. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL COURTS 10 (Little, Brown and Co. 1977).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
81.

PETER F.

JUSTICE 70

AN

ORGANIZATIONAL

ANALYSIS OF

NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL

(1978).
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According to Nardulli, members of the courtroom workgroup conduct
in a way that benefits both themselves and the group
their operations
2
as a whole.1
Nardulli criticized the work of earlier researchers for failing to consider
sentencing apart from other stages in the dispositional process and their
ignorance of:
[sentencing's] role within the court's overall dispositional strategy.
This impeded their ability to validly assess the role of extraneous
factors in criminal court sentencing. It also hampered their ability to
identify sources of disparities in sentencing.8"
Nardulli further noted that considering the concerns of the courtroom
elite, could "yield4 significant and unique contributions to the study of

criminal courts.'

'

The presence or absence of legal counsel is a fundamental situational
variable to those who study the effects of the courtroom workgroup on
judicial sentencing."5 Some judges have been accused of a heavier hand
with unrepresented defendants.8 6 In the ideal, attorneys advance their
clients' interests and safeguard their legal rights. They also identify mitigating factors that a judge might consider when imposing sentences. 7
Often times, judges offer defendants lenient sentences based on their
attorneys' reputations or political connections. In other instances, where
the defendant has a "particularly adept" attorney, the prosecutor may
exercise his discretion and dismiss the case, even when evidence of guilt
is strong. 8 Thus, there are several ways in which presence of an attorney
could significantly affect a judge's sentencing.
Whether defendants obtain private or public representation may also
affect their potential sentences. Judges may severely sentence those represented by public defenders because the court regards them as less
competent than private counsel. A court administrator, for example,
posited that some black defendants in a large metropolitan area were
disadvantaged because their attorneys, public defenders, "are not considered 'real' lawyers by some, [and as a result] judges do not take
defense arguments as seriously."8' 9
The addition of the aforementioned factors, to the analyses of sentencing
decisions, greatly increased the number of items a researcher must consider. Maureen Mileski, for example, observed misdemeanor court proceedings and collected information on the defendants' offenses, prior

82. Id. at 69-70.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id. at 77.
85. See generally BLUM1BERO, supra notes 78 and 81; NARDULLI, supra note 82.
86. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
87, 101-02, 107-08 (1968).
87. See Mileski, supra note 26, at 491.
88. Id. at 492.
89. THOMAS M. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE: BLACK JUDGES AND DEFENDANTS IN AN URBAN TIUAL
COURT 101 (1979).
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records, and individual characteristics such as race, age, and gender. 9°
In addition, she noted whether the defendants were represented by counsel,
whether the attorneys were court appointed or privately employed, as
well as the defendants' pleas, specific interactions between judges, and
the length of such discussions. 9'
Mileski did not find the existence of judicial bias against blacks. 92 On
the contrary, for at least one class of crimes-public intoxication-whites
were more likely to be sentenced to jail. In place of jail, blacks were
fined. 93 Mileski offered an explanation; whites who were intoxicated in
public were more likely to be classified by the courtroom workgroup as
"skid row drunks"-older, homeless indigents who were nearly or already
passed out. 94 Conversely, intoxicated blacks, who tended to be younger
and employed, were arrested for engaging in rowdy behavior. 95 The
different sentences can be attributed to different types of behaviors, not
to race. Mileski further concluded that sentences for blacks were akin
to those for whites: "it is simply that proportionately more white defendants" are likely to be skid row drunks.9
Peter Nardulli argued that sentencing is the "most potent tool" for
enforcing compliance with norms that allow the courtroom workgroup
to operate expeditiously. 97 The court punishes those defendants who
frustrate the workgroup's efficiency efforts more severely than those who
cooperate. 98 Nardulli reexamined existing data on sentencing decisions in
429 felony cases processed in Chicago during 1972-73. 99 Using a multiple
regression equation, he concluded that penalties increased significantly
for defendants who failed to cooperate with the courtroom workgroup.
For example, a defendant who made one or no legal motions could
expect a sentence of 25 months for armed robbery, while a similar
defendant would receive a sentence of 64 months if he or she made
between two and five motions. If the same defendant made more than
five motions, he or she could expect a sentence of 102 months. l°°
James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob also examined the effects of
organizational factors on judicial sentencing.' 0 ' They interviewed members

90. See Mileski, supra note 26, at 478, 494, 502, 505-506.
91. Id. at 487, 493, 516-17, 522.
92. See id. at 516.
93. Id. at 507.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 508. There is no evidence to support the concept that whites are more likely than
blacks to be skid row inhabitants. The differences noted by Mileski between black and white offenders
arrested for being drunk in public might have been the result of police activities. Officers may have
chosen to handle rowdy, young, employed, intoxicated whites in a manner other than arresting
them.
97. NARDULLI, supra note 81, at 56.
98. Id.
99. See generally NARDULLI, supra note 81.
100. Id. at 216. It may well be that the number of motions indicates that the cases were not
similar to begin with. Defendants facing long sentences may have made every possible motion in
order to better their chances of acquittal or appeal.
101. See generally EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 80, at vi.
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of courtroom workgroups, observed cases, and collected case file data
for a sample of felonies processed in 1972, in Baltimore, Chicago, and
Detroit. The researchers found that the identity of the courtroom workgroups (that is, which group specifically processed the case) and the type
of crimes for which defendants were convicted influenced the decision
of whether to send offenders to prison. The defendants' individual characteristics did not significantly affect the lengths of their imprisonments.
Eisenstein and Jacob's study was not without its methodological problems. First, while they examined the "combined effects" of race, age,
type of attorney, bail status, and prior record in their multivariate analysis,
the authors did not specifically discuss how they combined factors in
order to form this multi-variable.' 0 2 Prior record alone, for example,
might have driven any relation, since numerous studies have found that
it has a significant affect on sentencing. 0 3 Additionally, while some factors
had the tendency to increase sentences, others tended to decrease them.
In the final analysis, these individual factors may have canceled each
other out, thereby resulting in "no effect." If prior record, for example,
greatly influenced sentences while gender and race only had a minimal
effect, a construct composed of all three variables may appear to have
irrationally impacted sentences.
°
Eisenstein and Jacob's analysis signaled the end of bivariate research. 4
Their employment of multivariate statistics allowed them to examine the
''simultaneous" effects of several factors on sentence determinations.
Earlier researchers scrutinized one variable, and its effect on sentencing,
at a time. The authors explained that multivariate methods were necessary
105
to obtain an accurate picture of the courts' dispositions of cases.
Eisenstein and Jacob wrote:
Felony dispositions result from a very complex set of social interactions. No single variable or factor can explain them. Consequently,
we cannot simply classify dispositions according to race of defendants,
their prior record, or their bail status, and expect to demonstrate a
others-instrong relationship. These characteristics-together with
teract in complex ways to produce the final results.'06
°7
By the time Eisenstein's and Jacob's book was published, other researchers'
were also using multivariate methods, in large part due to the spread of
computers and packaged statistical programs which facilitated sophisticated analyses.' 0 Bivariate analysis eventually lost its prominence in the
research community.

102. Id. at 182.
103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. ESEaNSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 80, at 185.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Theodore G. Chiricos & Gordon P. Waldo, Socioeconomic Status and Criminal
Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of a Conflict Proposition, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 753 (1975).
108. See generally, EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 80, at 185, 189 n.4, using a very early version
of SPSS (Statistical Program for the Social Sciences) for their computations, thus indicating that
computer resources were available for those completing research in the social sciences.
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JOHN HAGAN
The availability of computer-assisted analyses altered the arena where
the methodological fight over bias in judicial sentencing occurs. John
Hagan's excellent 1974 review of the effects of extra-legal factors on
judicial sentencing drew new battle lines. °9
Hagan noted that earlier research failed to control for the effects of
significant legal factors and unsatisfactorily explained the variation in
sentence severity. He was struck by the minute relationships that had
previously been observed. He calculated a measure of association, Goodman and Kruskal's tau-b, for studies that failed to incorporate such
measures, in order to determine how well earlier researchers predicted
sentence severity in their models. Hagan concluded that while a number
of relationships indicating bias were statistically significant, they revealed
little regarding sentencing decisions." 0 He attributed findings of statistical
significance in past studies to the large sample sizes that were often used
in judicial bias research. Statistical significance can be easily obtained
with large studies.
Hagan also addressed the inconsistent findings reported by researchers."'
While one study found that blacks were sentenced more harshly, another
found that blacks were treated leniently. This problem, Hagan surmised,
could be related to differences in the way each researcher defined the
length of sentences and/or the lack of controls for appropriate legal
factors, including the severity of offenders' crimes and their prior records.
For the purposes of simplifying statistical analyses, data were often
dichotomized. Bullock, for example, classified the lengths of sentences
into two separate categories: less than ten years and ten years or longer. 112
Thus, different definitions among researchers, regarding what constituted
a long sentence versus a short sentence, could easily influence findings
and give results the appearance of fluctuation.
While many researchers were already doing what they could to avoid
the problems Hagan raised, this would not minimize his work. At a time
when many academics were rushing to analyze existing data sets with
new statistical models, he alone stopped to address the methodological
problems.
MORE ADVANCED MODELS
Theodore Chiricos and Gordon Waldo were among the first researchers
studying judicial sentencing to put increasingly sophisticated math models
and statistical analyses to use."' They collected government data for
individuals convicted of felonies committed between 1969 and 1973 in

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Hagan, supra note 27, at 380.
Id. at 375.
See id.
See Bullock, supra note 54, at 412.
See, e.g., Chiricos & Waldo, supra note 107.
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North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida." 4 Rather than dichotomizing

the data, sentence length was measured in months to preserve its continuous nature. For example, life sentences were coded as 480 months.
Chiricos and Waldo also employed a stepwise multiple correlation model,
using seven variables, to predict sentence length in Florida. These variables
included race, socio-economic status, age, the degree of urbanization,

prior convictions, prior incarceration in a juvenile institution, and number
of arrests." 5 Unlike simple correlations, the stepwise model ranks each

decided
factor in order of importance. Using this process, the authors
6
that extra-legal matters had little impact on sentencing."
Alan Lizotte built on the work of Hagan and Chiricos and Waldo." 7
He employed a sophisticated statistical technique known as path analysis,
to evaluate the effects of many variables at one time. Lizotte sought to
show, among other things, that "judges and juries assign sentences along
' 8
racial . . . lines . . . due to prejudice and economic discrimination.""
Using Nardulli's data, Lizotte reanalyzed a sample of 816 cases processed
by the Chicago trial courts in 1971 and 1972.19
Lizotte's first model hypothesized significant relationships between eight
variables and the length of an offender's sentence. 20 His analysis also

examined relationships between race' and (1) sentence length, (2) prior
arrests, (3) bail amount, (4) ability to post bail, (5) offense seriousness,
and (6) extent of evidence. Lizotte's analysis failed to establish a direct
correlation between race and sentence length. However, he found that
the inability to make bail led to longer estimated prison sentences. Lizotte
concluded that black defendants, because of financial inabilities, were
sixteen percent less likely to make bail than whites. He noted that the
sentences of blacks were approximately four months longer than those

of whites.

22

114. The felonies examined included second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
manslaughter, forcible rape, statutory rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, unarmed robbery,
burglary, larceny, receiving stolen property, auto theft, embezzlement, forgery, drug offenses, escape,
and arson. Id. at 760. These crimes were selected because they were the only offenses for which
at least 20 offenders were convicted. Id. at 758. First degree murder was excluded because of the
lack of variation; murders in the first degree were punished almost exclusively with life imprisonment
or death. Id.
115. Florida was the only state for which demographic data and prior records were available to
the researchers. Chiricos & Waldo, supra note 107, at 761.
116. Race, for example, explained less than two percent of the variance for twelve of thirteen
Florida offenses. Id. at 763. For the one exception, second degree murder, race was the most
important predictor of sentence length and explained seven percent of the variance. Id. at 761.
117. See, e.g., Alan J. Lizotte, Extra-legal Factors in Chicago's Criminal Courts: Testing the
Conflict Model of Criminal Justice. 25 Soc. PROBS. 564 (1978).
118. Id. at 564.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 567. The independent variables fell into three categories: (1) legal (prior arrests,
offense seriousness, and amount of evidence); (2) extra-legal (race, socioeconomic status, and ability
to post bail); and (3) organizational (bail amount, defense attorney's degree of success in sentencing).
Id.
121. Race and occupation were presented together as exogenous variables. Id.
122. Findings by others support Lizotte. Researchers on the Manhattan Bail Project found that
defendants held in custody before trial were more likely to be convicted than those who were free
before their trials. See Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on
the Use of Pretrial Parole, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 90 (1963).
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Lizotte recognized that his findings were insufficient proof of racial
bias in judicial sentencing. 23 Instead, his "model represents the complicated interweaving of extra-legal and legal characteristics and the way in
which they affect criminal sentencing." He argued, "[t]o view class-based
extra-legal characteristics of defendants as the prime mover in the criminal
justice system would be as naive as claiming that they have no effect
' 24
at all on criminal sanctioning.' 1
COMBINING MODELS
Thomas Uhlman noted that earlier researchers had tested three model
hypotheses with respect to judicial bias: (1) blacks are sentenced more
harshly than whites because their offenses are more serious (criminality);
(2) blacks are treated harsher because they are poor (class status); and
25
(3) blacks are discriminated against because of their race (racism).
Uhlman argued that to fully understand the influence of race on sentence,
researchers must consider the three models jointly. Whatever relationship
remained after the criminality and class status models "have had the
26
chance to operate" could be attributed to racism.
To test his theory, Uhlman obtained official sentencing data for 34,258
black defendants and 9,344 white defendants who appeared in a metropolitan trial court between 1968 and 1974. 127 He performed two separate
analyses. First, he determined whether there was a relationship between
the type of offenses defendants committed and (1) their likelihood of
being convicted, (2) their likelihood of being sent to prison, and (3) the
length of their sentences, in months.I 2 Based upon his analysis, Uhlman
reported that blacks were punished more severely than whites for 15 out
of 16 crimes, ranging from gambling to murder. He also found that
blacks were twice as likely as their white counterparts to receive prison
sentences. 29 However, Uhlman did not find evidence that blacks were
substantially more likely than whites to be convicted. 30
In Uhlman's second inquiry, he utilized path analyses designed to
measure the effects of the three aforementioned models on the length
of defendants' sentences.' He also sought to measure the effects of the
following: (1) the types of offenders' offenses, (2) the seriousness of
their acts, (3) the number of charges against them, (4) their bail amounts,

123. Lizotte, supra note 117, at 578.
124. Id.
125. See generally UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 83-85; Thomas M. Uhlman, The
Impact of Defendant Race In Trial-Court Sanctioning Decisions, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
19, 27-31 (1977).
126. Id. at 31.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 78.
130. Although the difference was statistically significant, blacks were only four percent more
likely than whites to be convicted. Id.
131. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 89, at 82.
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(5) their pretrial status, (6) the types of attorney representation, (7) the
13 2
types of plea agreements entered into, and (8) any charge reductions.
Using this approach, Uhlman was able to attribute part of his finding
that blacks were punished more severely than whites to their inability to
secure adequate counsel or make bail.
Uhlman did, however, find a direct association between race and
sentences, which indicated that blacks may have been sentenced more
severely by judges simply because they were black. However, this result
did not escape self-criticism.' 3 3 He recognized that part of his "racism"
findings could have been associated with prior record, socio-economic
status, and unknown defendant characteristics .134 Despite the sophistication
of his analysis, Uhlman was plagued by the same methodological problem
that had troubled Sellin 35 fifty years earlier-those who had originally
36
collected the data had not done so with his research in mind.
MEASUREMENT OF PRIOR RECORD
Researchers began recognizing that valid results could only be obtained
if they paid much more attention to the quality of their data and measures.
Highly sophisticated analyses cannot produce valid results when flawed
data is the foundation of the analyses.' 37 Past research using the accused's
prior record in examining sentencing decisions is an example of how
results can be misleading.
Susan Welch and her associates noted that although many researchers
included some measure of prior record in their analyses, they did so in
varied ways. 38 Some academics used only arrests as evidence of a criminal
past, while other researchers required some form of a conviction to
establish a prior record for defendants.'3 9 Moreover, other scholars limited
their definition of a prior record to include only those who had been
incarcerated.' 40 There were even some academics who developed a fourpoint summary scale that incorporated the number of arrests, convictions,
and prison terms into their research. 14' In all, Welch and associates
identified eleven different ways 42prior records were incorporated into
research on sentencing decisions.
Welch and her colleagues examined whether or not the eleven measurements were interchangeable.143 They studied a sample of 2,600 male

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 94.
See Sellin, supra note 12, at 54.
Id.
Joseph E. McGrath. Dilemmatics: The Study of Research Choices and Dilemmas, in JUDGEMENT CALLS r1 RESEARCH BEVERLY HILLS 69, 102 (Joseph E. McGrath et al. eds. 1982).
138. See Susan Welch et al., Sentencing: The Influence of Alternative Measures of Prior Record,
22 CRMNOLOGY 215, 216 (1984).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
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defendants who committed one of fourteen felonies. These cases were
all processed in large cities located in the northeastern United States
between 1968 and 1979.1" The authors concluded that the measures of
prior criminal records were not interchangeable. They found that "researchers who use misdemeanor or felony arrest as an indicator of prior
record are tapping something very different from those who use some
measure of incarceration.'" If researchers used arrests only, they would
easily conclude that prior records failed to affect the likelihood of imprisonment or the severity of sentences. On the other hand, if they used
a form of prior incarceration, their conclusions would be quite the
opposite. Judges punished those with prior convictions more severely than
those who were merely arrested but never convicted.
Welch and her associates found that the eleven diverse measures of
prior record affected blacks and whites differently.146 For example, whites
who had previously served time in prison were seventeen percent more
likely to be reincarcerated than their white counterparts who had never
served prison terms. 4 7 The difference for blacks was less; blacks who
had served a prior prison term were ten percent more likely to be
reincarcerated than blacks who had never been in prison.'" Welch and
her associates concluded that researchers should use a measure of prior
record that reflects some form of incarceration because such measures
49
consistently affect sentences for blacks and whites.
THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON MINORITIES
By the mid-1970s there was no indisputable evidence that judges were
biased against blacks or any other group.' 50 There was, however, plenty
of anecdotal evidence that some offenders were not getting fair prison
sentences due to indeterminate sentencing. 5' The philosophy that criminals
could be rehabilitated led legislatures to enact indeterminate sentences
for offenses.' For example, a robber might expect to receive a sentence
of one year to life. Consequently, with indeterminate sentencing, a parole
board later decides the exact moment of release for the robber. Some
offenders, however, ended up serving long sentences for minor offenses
when their parole boards proved unforgiving or the offender "misbe-

144. Welch et al., supra note 138, at 217-18.
145. Id. at 219-20.
146. Welch and her associates regressed their two dependent variables (whether the defendant was
sent to prison and sentence severity) on the eleven measures of prior record, while controlling for
type of offense. They did this for blacks, then for whites. See id. at 223.
147. Id. at 222.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 223.
150. See Hagan, supra note 27, at 357-58.
151. See, e.g., MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CaANA. SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 86-102 (1973).
152. Donald E.J. MacNamara, The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace, 14 CRnINOLOGY 439, 440-41 (1977).
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haved" in prison.' 53 These sentencing inconsistencies, combined with the
perceived failure of5 4rehabilitation, led to a national restructuring of
sentencing ideology. 1
Legislatures enacted sentencing guidelines in an attempt to limit disparities in penalties due to racial or other biases. These guidelines establish
specific sentences based on the characteristics of the defendant's crime
and prior criminal record.' 55 The enactment of the guidelines sparked a
new round of research that no longer was obsessed with trying to universally prove or disprove racial bias. Instead, academics devised methodologies designed to answer specific questions.
"RACIALLY TAINTED" CRITERIA
One of the first questions academics tackled was whether sentencing
guidelines would eliminate racial disparities in punishments. Joan Petersilia
and Susan Turner examined the effects of guidelines on the dispositions
of 16,500 males sentenced to California prisons in 1980. The offenders
were sentenced for crimes of robbery, assault, burglary, theft, forgery,
or drug possession. 5 6 California's 1977 Determinate Sentencing Act presumably limited judicial discretion in sentencing.
Petersilia's and Turner's results indicated that some of the criteria
utilized to establish sentences were likely to be associated with one race
or the other. For example, blacks were more likely to be on probation
or parole at the moment of their offenses. Blacks were also more likely
to injure their victims or use weapons during the crimes. Under California's Sentencing Act these three facts and circumstances increase the
length of defendants' sentences. ' 7 In comparison, crimes relating to alcoholism and drug abuse, two criteria used to determine the appropri58
ateness of probation, were more likely to be found among white offenders.
The authors concluded that the guidelines would not eliminate racial
disparities in sentencing because of the "racially tainted" criteria that
judges employed.15 9
CHICANOS AS A DISTINCT GROUP
Punishments ordered by judges pursuant to California's Determinate
Sentencing Act were also examined by Marjorie Zatz. 6° Zatz contended
that findings from earlier research may have been tainted because "Hispanics" were not included in the research samples.' 6' Hispanics, she
153. See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (1981).
154. WILLiAM L. SELKE, PuSONS IN CISSs 24-25 (1993); Andrew von Hirsch, Control of Discretion:
Guidelines and Standards, in SENTENCING (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
155. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (1991).

156. JOAN PETERS.IA & SUSAN TURNER, GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: Tn IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL
MINORITIES 14 (1985).

157. Id. at 17.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Marjorie S. Zatz, Race, Ethnicity, and Determinate Sentencing: A New Dimension
to an Old Controversy, 22 CRIMNOLOoY 147 (1984).
161. Id. at 148. The terms "Hispanics" and "Chicanos" are both used by Zatz.
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argued, are different from both whites and blacks. 162 Research in areas
where they form a sizable part of the population should include Hispanics
as a third important study group:
The vast majority of studies compare sentencing patterns either for
Whites and Blacks or for Whites and the ambiguous group "nonwhites." The former categorization of race totally ignores the racial/
ethnic minorities. The latter assumes without any empirical basis that
all minorities are treated similarly, at least in comparison with Whites
[TInclusion of Hispanics in sentencing research is critical.' 63
....
Zatz used an advanced multivariate statistical technique to examine the
length of sentences doled out to 4,729 Hispanics, whites, and blacks in
California during 1978.'6 She found that the prior criminal records of
Hispanics significantly influenced their sentences whereas prior records
were relatively unimportant for whites and blacks. 65 In addition, judges
generally penalized Hispanics who entered "slow pleas" more harshly
than their white or black counterparts.'" Slow pleas are defined as
instances where defendants change their initial pleas of not guilty to
guilty after their arraignments. Zatz concluded that Hispanics are treated
differently from blacks and whites by the courts. Zatz concluded that
researchers should treat Hispanics as a distinct category instead of lumping
them together with other minorities when studying white/non-white com67
parisons. 1

ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES
In the late 1980s researchers explored the possibility that factors outside
the courtroom might affect punishments ordered by judges. For example,
researchers hypothesized that in a district known for its substantial income
inequality, magistrates may severely punish property offenders in order
to protect the interests of the powerful. However, intra-class assaults
among the poor may be lightly penalized because the powerful are
unconcerned with what happens in poverty stricken neighborhoods. 68 To
examine such notions, Martha Myers introduced a number of ecological
matters, such as a county's ethnic composition and income, into her
research.169
Myers scrutinized the punishments ordered by Georgia judges for 15,270
felons between 1976 and 1982.170 Her analyses indicated that harsher

162. Id. at 148-49.
163. Id. at 148.
164. Zatz, supra note 160, at 151-52.
165. Id. at 157.
166. Id.at 162.
167. Id.at 165.
168. See Myers, supra note 62, at 747-48.
169. Id.at 748-49.
170. Id. at 749. The independent variables included area inequality measures (such as percent
black and the difference between white and black mean income in each county), legal variables
(such as offense seriousness and prior record), extra-legal characteristics of offenders (such as race
and age), and control variables (such as index crime rates and percentage of crimes involving
weapons). Id. at 750-52.
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penalties for blacks were more common in areas characterized by greater
income inequality. 171 In counties with a majority black population, however, blacks were treated with more favor. Myers attributed this to the
presence of a "relatively powerful black middle or upper-middle class"
that may be less likely to condone racial bias. 172 However, in areas with
few blacks, this source of power may be non-existent.
In an analogous study, George Bridges and his colleagues examined
imprisonment rates for whites and nonwhites in thirty-nine Washington
counties between 1980 and 1982.17 The authors concluded that increases
in a county's ethnic makeup and degree of urbanization were associated
with heightened likelihoods of imprisonment for minorities. These factors,
however,74 appeared to have no effect on the chances of incarceration for
whites. 1
The work of Myers and Bridges and colleagues, demonstrates the need
for academics to consider characteristics of the area in which sentencing
takes place. Their work indicates that sentencing can be affected by forces
outside of the case at hand. In considering these forces, these researchers
expanded the methodological battlefield.
JUDICIAL RACE
Changes in societal attitudes and laws have increased the numbers of
17
minorities attending law schools and receiving appointments as jurists.
At a time when black judges were*almost nonexistent, researchers assumed
that disparities in sentences resulted from racism by white judges against
black defendants. 176 Recent increases in the number of black judges have
given rise to studies that consider both the defendant's and judge's
ethnicity. Cassia Spohn, for example, considered whether white judges
were more likely than black judges to discriminate against black defendants. 177 To explore this possibility, Spohn collected information on 4,710
felony cases processed in Detroit between 1976 and 1978.178
Spohn concluded that legal matters, such as the offenses for which
defendants were convicted or their prior criminal records, "clearly over-

171. Myers, supra note 62, at 754-55. Income inequality is "indicated by county income standard
deviation based on 1979 Census family income data." Id. at 750. Those areas with high variance
(areas with large income differences between citizens) have greater income inequality. Id.
172. Id. at 761.
173. See George S. Bridges et al., Crime, Social Structure and Criminal Punishment: White and
Nonwhite Rates of Imprisonment 34 Soc. PROBS. 345 (1987).
174. Id. at 354.
175. Charles L. Cappell, The Status of Black Lawyers, 17 WORK & OCCUPATION 100, 104 (1990).
See also Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference? 36 AM. J. POL. ScI. 126 (1988).
176. See Katz, supra note 86, at 126-38.
177. See generally Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected
and Unexpected Similarities, 24 LAW & Soc'y REv. 1197 (1990).
178. Id. at 1201. In addition to race of judge and defendant, Spohn examined the effects on
sentence severity of type of offense, number of instant offenses, prior record, weapon use, injury
to victim, whether the victim was a stranger, type of attorney, type of plea, pretrial detention, and
the defendant's age and gender. Id. at 1203-04.
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shadowed" the effects of any other items with respect to sentencing. 17 9
Overall, the race of judges and defendants played a minimal, if any,
role in sentencing. s0 However, there were some circumstances in which
judicial race may have affected penalties. Black judges were slightly less
likely than white judges to send offenders to jail. 18' This judicial leniency,
sentenced
however, did not favor black defendants. Black defendants were
82
more harshly than whites by both black and white judges.
BIAS IN ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING
Most studies of sentencing have focused on felony courts where increased use of sentencing guidelines have attempted to limit judicial
discretion. 83 James Meeker and his colleagues took a different tactic.'84
They collected data on 106 first-time, non-serious misdemeanor offenders
sentenced to community service work after pleading guilty in a southern
California municipal court district. The municipal court judges were free
to exercise their discretion and determine the length of sentences as well
as where sentences were to be served. 8 5

The strategy employed by the researchers allowed them to avoid some
methodological problems. For example, because the defendants were all

first-time offenders, measurement of prior criminal record was not a
concern.8 6 Furthermore, the study was not limited to the sentencing of
offenders guilty of a limited list of crimes. Instead, defendants had
committed an extensive variety of crimes, yet there was little variation
8 7
between the seriousness of the offenses since they were all misdemeanors.

In addition, all the offenders had entered pleas of guilty, so there was
no need to consider the effects of trials or other items associated with
the courtroom workgroup.' 88
Meeker and his colleagues found that the duration of the offenders'
community service was determined by the seriousness of their offenses
whereas their placements might be affected by other matters.' 8 9 In particular, Hispanics and males were more likely to be ordered by judges
to pick up trash and do other tasks along California's freeways, a

179. Id. at 1206.

180. Id. at 1211.
181. Id. at 1208.
182. Id. at 1209. To determine if black and white judges sentenced black and white offenders
differently, Spohn ran separate regressions to test for differences between judges when sentencing
those of their own race versus others. The regressions were run on four separate samples: (1) black
judge/black offender, (2) black judge/white offender, (3) white judge/white offender, and (4) white
judge/black offender. Id. at 1208-09.
183. See James J. Alfini & Patricia M. Passuth, Case Processing in State Misdemeanor Courts:
The Effect of Defense Attorney Presence, 6 JusT. SYS. J. 100 (1981).
184. See James W. Meeker et al., Bias in Sentencing: A Preliminary Analysis of Community
Service Sentences, 10 BEHAVIORAL ScI. & L. 197 (1992).
185. Id. at 199-200.
186. Id. at 199.
187. Id.at 201.
188. Meeker et al., supra note 184, at 199.
189. Id. at 199-200.
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punishment that the judges felt was very unpleasant.'19 However, whites
and women did their community service in more pleasant surroundings.
The authors suggested that the placement bias was due to the unrestricted
ability of the judges to assign offenders as they saw fit. Therefore,
Meeker and his colleagues concluded that discretion led to bias.' 91
BRIEF SUMMARY OF BIAS LITERATURE IN JUDICIAL
SENTENCING
It is readily apparent from our review of the relevant studies that the
seriousness of the offenders' crimes, combined with their prior criminal
records have the greatest influence upon the severity of punishments
judges impose on them. These two factors consistently explain most of
92
the variability in sentence severity.
Extra-legal matters appear to have minimal effects on judicially ordered
penalties. While early researchers, before 1950, often found evidence of
racial bias, they seldom considered the impact of important legal items
on their results. 193 In response to criticisms raised during the 1970s,
researchers utilized sophisticated methods and statistics to study judicial
sentencing.' 94 These examinations, for the most part, reported limited
effects of extra-legal offender characteristics on judicial punishments.' 95
The research suggests that judges are fairly color blind when sentencing
defendants. Legally relevant criteria are much more important than racial
bias. However, the research also shows that sentencing is a complex
decision that is not simply limited to legally relevant criteria. Sentencing
may reflect many external factors including the social mores of the
surrounding communities from which the judges are often drawn, the
pressures on key personnel in the justice system, and the amount of
unrest between racial or other groups in the district. Studies that utilize
official government data may never disentangle all the important items.
Future studies might prove more fruitful from the perspective of policymakers if researchers collected their own data on the operation of the
courts. Projects could be designed that explore a broad range of potential
influences on judicial decisions and avoid many of the inadequacies that
are associated with studies of court bias that rely on government data.
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Such comprehensive work can better pinpoint where problems may exist
and suggest possible solutions.

